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Abstract:
Certificateless cryptography has attracted a lot of attention from the research
community, due to its applicability in information security. In this paper, we analyze
two recently proposed certificateless signature schemes and point out their security
flaws. In particular, we demonstrate universal forgeries against these schemes with
known message attacks.
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1 Introduction
Certificateless cryptography [1] is a new paradigm that not only removes the inherent key escrow
problem of identity based public cryptography [2] (ID-PKC for short), but also eliminates the cumber-
some certificate management in traditional PKI. In CL-PKC, the actual private key of a user is comprised
of two secrets: a secret value and a partial private key. The user generates a secret value by himself, while
the partial private key is generated by a third party called Key Generating Center (KGC), who makes use
of a system wide master key and the user’s identity information. In this way, the key escrow problem in
identity-based public key cryptosystems is removed. A user’s public key is derived from his/her actual
private key, identity and system parameters. It could be available to other entities by transmitting along
with signatures or by placing in a public directory. Unlike the traditional PKI, there is no certificate in
certificateless public key cryptography to ensure the authenticity of the entity’s public key. A number of
certificateless signature schemes [3–14] have been proposed. Some of them are analysed under reason-
able security models with elaborate security proofs [8, 11, 13, 14], while some others are subsequently
broken due to flawed security proof or unreasonable model [3, 6–8, 12].
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Recently two certificateless signature schemes were proposed in [4] and [5] respectively. They were
claimed to provide high efficiency and provable security. In this short note, unfortunately, we show that
these two schemes [4, 5] are insecure even in a very weak security model. Namely these two schemes
are suffering from universal forgeries under known message attacks.
2 Review of the Original Schemes
We omit the preliminaries, basic notions, and security models about certificateless signature schemes.
Please refer to [1, 8, 11, 13, 14] for details. The two original schemes [4, 5] are based on bilinear maps.
They were both called McCLS scheme. To distinguish them, we call the one in [4] as McCLS1, and the
other one in [5] as McCLS2.
2.1 Description of McCLS1
We first describe McCLS1. It consists of the following five algorithms.
• Setup. On input a security parameter, it generates a list of system parameters { p, G, G, e^, P,
Ppub, H, H} and a system master private key s∈ Z
∗
p, where p is a large prime, G,G are groups of
order p with an admissible bilinear map e^ : G×G → G, H : {,}
∗
→ G and H : {,}
∗
→ Z∗p
are cryptographical Hash functions, P is a generator of G, and Ppub = sP.
• Extract Partial Private Key. On input a user identity ID, it computes QID = H(ID), and outputs
DID = sQID as the user’s partial private key.
• Generate Key Pair. A user with identity ID selects a random x ∈ Z∗p as its secret value SID, and
publish its public key PID = xPpub.
• CL-Sign. Given a user’s private keys (DID,SID) and a message M, the user randomly picks an
element r ∈ Z∗p, computes S = SID
−DID, R = (r − SID)P, V = H(M,R,PID)r, and outputs σ =
(S,R,V ) as his/her signature on message M under the public key PID.
• CL-Verify. Given a signature (S,R,V ) on a message M of a user ID with public key PID, a veri-
fier computes h = H(M,R,PID) and checks whether (Ppub,V P− hR,h
−S,QID) is a valid Diffie-
Hellman tuple, namely whether the equation e^(V P−hR,h−S) = e^(Ppub,QID) holds.
2.2 Description of McCLS2
The first three algorithms of McCLS2 in [5] are exactly the same as those of McCLS1 in [4]. There
are slight differences in the CL-Sign and CL-Verify algorithms. We just depict the differences here.
• CL-Sign. Given a user’s private keys (DID,SID) and a message M, the user randomly picks an
element r ∈ Z∗p, computes S = SID
−DID, R = (r− SID)P, V = H(M,R,PID)rP and outputs σ =
(S,R,V ) as his/her signature on message M under public key PID.
• CL-Verify. Given a signature (S,R,V ) on a message M of a user ID with public key PID, a verifier
computes h=H(M,R,PID) and checks whether (Ppub,V −hR,h
−S,QID) is a valid Diffie-Hellman
tuple, namely whether the equation e^(V −hR,h−S) = e^(Ppub,QID) holds.
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3 Universal forgery
As we can see, in the McCLS schemes, a signature on a message M of a user ID with public key
PID consists of three components S, R and V . Note that for a user ID with public key PID, S remains
unchanged for all messages, R andV are irrelevant to the partial private key DID. Here we give two kinds
of universal forgery under known message attacks.
3.1 Attacks Against McCLS1
1. Universal forgery by replacing public key
The scheme McCLS1 cannot resist public key replacement attacks of a type I adversaryA. For the
definition of type I and type II adversaries, please refer to [1, 4, 5, 8, 11, 13, 14]. Let σ = (S,R,V )
be ID’s valid signature on a message M, where
S = SID
−DID, R = (r−SID)P, V = H(M,R,PID)r, and r ∈R Z
∗
p.
Given R and V , the random number r can be easily derived as r = V H(M,R,PID)
−. And then
SIDP is known as SIDP= rP−R. NowA is able to forge a user ID’s valid signature on any message
m as follows:
(a) Choose a random c ∈ Z∗p and let r
′ = cr ∈ Z∗p;
(b) Replace ID’s public key as P ′ID = cPID (the new secret value corresponding to the public key
P ′ID is S
′
ID = cSID );
(c) Compute S ′ = c−S,R ′ = cR,V ′ = H(m,R
′
,P ′ID)r
′;
(d) Set σ ′ = (S ′,R ′,V ′) as ID’s signature on message m under the public key P ′ID. We can see
that (Ppub,V
′P−H(m,R
′
,P ′ID)R
′
,H(m,R
′
,P ′ID)
−S ′,QID) is a valid Diffie-Hellman tuple
since
e^(V ′P−H(m,R
′
,P ′ID)R
′
,H(m,R
′
,P ′ID)
−S ′)
= e^((H(m,R
′
,P ′ID)crP)−H(m,R
′
,P ′ID)(crP− cSIDP)),H(m,R
′
,P ′ID)
−c−S)
= e^(H(m,R
′
,P ′ID)cSIDP,H(m,R
′
,P ′ID)
−c−S)
= e^(SIDP,S)
= e^(P,DID)
= e^(Ppub,QID)
2. Universal forgery without replacing public key
From ID’s valid signature σ = (S,R,V ) on a message M, the adversary can get
r =V H(M,R,PID)
−
,SIDP = rP−R.
With these he can forage a signature σ ′ = (S ′,R ′,V ′) on any message m without replacing ID’s
public key as follows:
Pick r ′ ∈R Z
∗
p, and compute S
′ = S, R ′ = r ′P− sIDP, V
′ = H(m,R
′
,PID)r
′.
The verification will always output “accept" since
(Ppub,V
′P−H(m,R
′
,PID)R
′
,H(m,R
′
,PID)
−S ′,QID)
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is really a valid Diffie-Hellman tuple. The reason is
e^(V ′P−H(m,R
′
,PID)R
′
,H(m,R
′
,PID)
−S ′)
= e^(H(m,R
′
,PID)r
′P−H(m,R
′
,PID)(r
′P−SIDP),H(m,R
′
,PID)
−S)
= e^(H(m,R
′
,PID)SIDP,H(m,R
′
,PID)
−S)
= e^(SIDP,S)
= e^(Ppub,QID)
3.2 Attacks Against McCLS2
1. Universal forgery by replacing public key
Let σ = (S,R,V ) be ID’s valid signature on a message M. It is obvious that
rP = H(M,P,PID)
−V , SIDP = rp−R.
A type I adversary A may forge ID’s valid signature on any message m as follows:
(a) Choose a random c ∈ Z∗p and let r
′ = cr ∈ Z∗p.
(b) Replace ID’s public key as P ′ID = cPID (this implies the new secret value corresponding to the
new public key P ′ID is S
′
ID = cSID ).
(c) Compute
S ′ = c−S,R ′ = (r ′−S ′ID)P = cR,V
′ = H(m,R
′
,P ′ID)r
′P = cH(m,R
′
,P ′ID)rP.
(d) Set σ ′ = (S ′,R ′,V ′) as ID’s signature on message m using public key P ′ID.
We can see (Ppub,V
′−H(m,R
′
,P ′ID)R
′
,H(m,R
′
,P ′ID)
−S ′,QID) is a valid Diffie-Hellman
tuple since
e^(V ′−H(m,R
′
,P ′ID)R
′
,H(m,R
′
,P ′ID)
−S ′)
= e^(H(m,R
′
,P ′ID)crP−H(m,R
′
,P ′ID)(crP− cSIDP),H(m,R
′
,P ′ID)
−c−S)
= e^(H(m,R
′
,P ′ID)cSIDP,H(m,R
′
,P ′ID)
−c−S)
= e^(SIDP,S)
= e^(P,DID)
= e^(Ppub,QID)
2. Universal forgery without replacing public key
The adversary can get
rP = H(M,R,PID)
−V , SIDP = rP−R = H(M,R,PID)
−V −R,
from ID’s valid signature σ = (S,R,V ) on a message M. Then it (may be type I or type II) can
forge a signature σ ′ = (S ′,R ′,V ′) on any message m without replacing ID’s public key as follows:
Pick r ′ ∈R Z
∗
p, and compute S
′ = S, R ′ = r ′P− sIDP, V
′ = H(m,R
′
,PID)r
′P.
The verification will always output “accept" since
(Ppub,V
′−H(m,R
′
,PID)R
′
,H(m,R
′
,PID)
−S ′,QID)
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is really a valid Diffie-Hellman tuple. This is because
e^(V ′−H(m,R
′
,PID)R
′
,H(m,R
′
,PID)
−S ′)
= e^(H(m,R
′
,PID)r
′P−H(m,R
′
,PID)(r
′P−SIDP),H(m,R
′
,PID)
−S)
= e^(H(m,R
′
,PID)SIDP,H(m,R
′
,PID)
−S)
= e^(SIDP,S)
= e^(Ppub,QID)
From these attacks, one can see McCLS1 and McCLS2 are insecure even in the weakest security
model.
4 Conclusion
Recently, two certificateless signature schemes McCLS1 and McCLS2 were proposed for Mobile
Wireless Cyber-Physical Systems. They only require two scalar multiplications in signing phase and
two scalar multiplications and one pairing in verification phase. So they are efficient with respect to
computational cost. Although the authors claimed and proved that McCLS1 and McCLS2 were secure,
as we have shown in this paper they are in fact insecure. Universal forgeries against those two schemes
have been presented under known message attacks.
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